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Abstract
Quantum weirdness has been in the news recently, thanks to an inge-
nious new experiment by a team led by Roland Hanson, at the Delft
University of Technology. Much of the coverage presents the experi-
ment as good (even conclusive) news for spooky action-at-a-distance,
and bad news for local realism. We point out that this interpretation
ignores an alternative, namely that the quantum world is retrocausal.
We conjecture that this loophole is missed because it is confused for su-
perdeterminism on one side, or action-at-a-distance itself on the other.
We explain why it is different from these options, and why it has clear
advantages, in both cases.
Quantum weirdness has been getting a lot of attention recently, thanks to
a clever new experiment by a team led by Roland Hanson, at the Delft Uni-
versity of Technology.1 Much of the coverage has presented the experiment
as good news for spooky action-at-a-distance, and bad news for Einstein:
“The most rigorous test of quantum theory ever carried out has confirmed
that the ‘spooky action-at-a-distance’ that [Einstein] famously hated . . . is
an inherent part of the quantum world,” as a report in Nature put it.2
Hanson’s experiment does, as claimed, make a convincing case for clos-
ing some of the best-known loopholes in the case for action-at-a-distance.
However, it is much further from settling the case against Einstein than
these responses suggest. There’s a large and promising loophole that simply
doesn’t show up on most commentators’ radar – or most physicists’ radar,
for that matter.3 When it gets noticed at all, it tends to get confused for
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1Hanson, R. et al, ‘Experimental loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality us-
ing entangled electron spins separated by 1.3 km’, Nature, online 21 October 2015
[doi:10.1038/nature15759][arXiv:1508.05949].
2Merali, Z., ‘Quantum ‘spookiness’ passes toughest test yet’, Nature, 27 August 2015
[http://www.nature.com/news/quantum-spookiness-passes-toughest-test-yet-1.18255].
3A commentary piece published in Nature in conjunction with the Hanson et al paper
claims that the new findings “rigorously reject” the hypothesis of local realism – i.e., that
the “world is made up of real stuff, existing in space and changing only through local
interactions.” (Wiseman, H., ‘Quantum physics: Death by experiment for local realism’,
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something else. So the fact that there’s still a viable alternative to action-
at-a-distance – arguably, a much more attractive alternative, and certainly
one that is untouched by the results from Hanson and his team – remains a
well-hidden secret.
This invisible loophole falls into a well-known category. The argument
for action-at-a-distance assumes that quantum particles don’t know what
measurements they are going to encounter in the future. A little more
technically, it assumes that the state of a particle before a measurement
is independent of the particular setting chosen for that measurement (the
choice whether to measure position or momentum, say). This sounds in-
nocuous enough. How could the particle know about that, before it reaches
the measurement device? But innocuous or not, it is crucial. Without this
independence assumption, the argument for action-at-a-distance just doesn’t
go through.
The invisible loophole rejects this independence assumption, but it is
confused for and obscured by another proposal for doing the same thing.
This better-known cousin is a well-recognised but deservedly unpopular little
loophole called superdeterminism. To see how superdeterminism proposes to
reject the independence assumption – and how there’s a much more attrac-
tive way of doing the same thing – let’s take a detour via medieval theology.
(Superdeterminism has ancient ancestors.)
Medieval interlude
History (curated by us for this occasion) tells of the fast-talking fourteenth
century theologian, Brother Bob, who was spotted one day throwing a stone
through the stained-glass window of Abbess Alice. “Oh, Brother,” chideth
the Abbess (something of a metaphysician herself), “You have caused a stone
to fly through the air, and that in turn has caused our precious window to
break. (But I forgive you.)”
“Thank you, kind Abbess,” replieth Bob, “But there is surely nothing
to forgive? Undoubtedly, the several movements of my arm, the stone, and
your unfortunate window, were all caused by He who causes all things. It
would be heresy – indeed, Heresy with a capital H – for me to take the
blame.”
Brother Bob is what philosophers call an occasionalist. He denies that
there is any causation in the world – at least, in the ordinary material world
of arms, rocks, and windows. Instead, the appearance of worldly causation
Nature, 21 October 2015, [doi:10.1038/nature15631]) The same claim seems to be endorsed
by Hanson et al themselves, when they write: “Our observation of a statistically significant
loophole-free Bell inequality violation thus indicates rejection of all local-realist theories
that accept that the number generators produce a free random bit in a timely manner
and that the outputs are final once recorded in the electronics.” However, the option we
describe here is entirely compatible with local realism.
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is all arranged by God. Whatever its theological merits, occasionalism has
not survived the rise of modern science. Alice’s description of the situation
is clearly the right one, by scientific lights (as well as by ordinary lights).
Yet occasionalism, or something very much like it, is the idea that su-
perdeterminism proposes to resurrect, to violate the independence assump-
tion. Brother Bob suggested that something in the background – i.e., in this
case, God – explains the correlation between his arm movements, the stone’s
flight, and the broken window. Analogously, superdeterminists propose that
something in the background – some new kind of hidden variable, perhaps,
or just some specific arrangement of the initial conditions of the Universe –
manages to coordinate the properties of quantum particles with choices of
settings for measurements that those same particles are yet to encounter.
This coordination makes it the case that particles with one property en-
counter position measurements, say, while particles with another property
encounter momentum measurements. As a result, the independence assump-
tion fails, and the argument for action-at-a-distance collapses.
Opponents object that this coordination seems to conflict with our view
that the measurement setting can be freely chosen, whether by a human
experimenter or by some random device (such as the Swiss national lottery
machine, as John Bell once suggested). This lack of free will was a virtue
for Brother Bob – it got him off the hook for breaking the window! But
for modern physicists it seems a major objection to superdeterminism. In-
deed, as opponents point out, the experimenter’s freedom of choice seems
presupposed by science.
Still, superdeterminism does get a mention in discussion of the Hanson
experiment. As New Scientist notes, for example:
There is one remaining loophole for local realists to cling to, but
no experiment can ever rule it out. What if there is some kind
of link between the random microwave generators and the detec-
tors? Then Alice and Bob might think they’re free to choose the
settings on their equipment, but hidden variables could interfere
with their choice and thwart the Bell test.4
Remarkably, however, all these discussions seem entirely blind to the fact
that there’s an option that sits right alongside superdeterminism, differing
from it in exactly the way that the ordinary explanation of the broken
window (that Bob caused the rock to fly, and so caused the window to
break) differs from Bob’s occasionalist proposal. This alternative version still
blocks the argument for action-at-a-distance, by rejecting the independence
assumption – but, as in the fourteenth century, it saves free will.
4‘Quantum weirdness proved real in first loophole-free ex-
periment’, New Scientist, Daily News, 28 August 2015.
[https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn28112-quantum-weirdness-proved-real-in-first-loophole-free-experiment/]
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Back to the future
To explain this invisible alternative, let’s fast-forward 700 years, and give
the floor to modern Alice and her brother Bob, who are quantum physicists,
and distant descendants of their medieval namesakes (whose friendship blos-
somed, after that “rocky” start – they fell in love, left the church, and raised
a family). Once again, Bob is the superdeterminist. “I know it’s an implau-
sible explanation of these entanglement experiments,” he says to Alice, “But
anything is better than spooky action-at-a-distance. Our famous ancestors
rejected spooks seven centuries ago, as did the Great One (I mean Einstein)
more recently. We should do the same.”
“I agree with you about the spooks, brother,” says Alice, “But isn’t
there a better alternative? Of course we are free to choose the measurement
settings, but why not say that the prior properties of the particles are caused
by the measurement settings, and hence indirectly by our choices? It’s just
like ordinary causation, except that in the quantum world causation turns
out to work backwards as well as forwards. Retrocausality – perhaps that’s
the real lesson of the quantum correlations!”
Alice’s suggestion is the overlooked spook-busting loophole we promised
you at the beginning. Mathematically speaking, it avoids the spooks in
exactly the way that superdeterminism does, by giving up the assumption
that the hidden properties of particles are independent of the measurements
they are going to encounter in the future. But it saves free will, in just the
way that the ordinary causal story about stones and windows saved free
will, back in the fourteenth century. Alice and Bob freely choose measure-
ment settings, just as their ancestor freely chose to throw that stone. The
measurement settings cause the incoming particle to have certain proper-
ties, just as the stone caused the window to break. The only difference is
that in this case, down at the microscopic level, some of the causation works
backwards.
At this point, Bob may feel that the proposed cure is worse than the
disease. Isn’t it just obvious that causation doesn’t work backwards? Well,
maybe, but why, exactly? If Bob wants to concede victory to the spooks,
he needs a good scientific argument that Alice’s alternative won’t work. So
far, Alice has the beginnings of an argument for the opposite conclusion.
If we allow retrocausality, we can avoid spooks – in the same way that
superdeterminism does, but without abandoning free will.
There are several lines of argument that Bob might try at this point. But
before we turn to those, let’s set aside another confusion. Some commen-
tators have trouble seeing that retrocausality isn’t just another version of
action-at-a-distance. In other words, they have trouble seeing that it really
does avoid the spooks. Let’s try to get this straight.
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The Parisian zigzag
The retrocausal proposal was first suggested by a young Parisian physicist,
Olivier Costa de Beauregard, in the 1950s.5 He saw it as an objection to
the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument from 1935. In that
argument, EPR assume that there can be no direct action-at-a-distance,
in order to conclude that a measurement on one particle cannot influence a
distant particle. Costa de Beauregard pointed out that we could have distant
influence without direct action-at-a-distance, so long as the influence takes
an indirect “zigzag” path through space and time, via the point at which
the two particles will have interacted in the past.
In the modern version of the retrocausal proposal, when entangled parti-
cles are produced together, the zigzag works like this. Alice’s (freely chosen)
measurement setting affects her particle, back to the moment when the two
particles were in contact, and hence affects Bob’s particle, too, without hav-
ing to jump any gap. So it affects Bob’s measurement results, via a continu-
ous path through spacetime. In other words, Alice’s choice of measurement
setting does have a subtle influence on the results of Bob’s measurements,
away on the other side of the experiment. (The same holds in reverse: Bob’s
choice of settings has a subtle influence on Alice’s results.) But it doesn’t
happen in the magical “through thin air” way that seemed so implausible
to Einstein, Schro¨dinger and many others. It happens on a continuous path
through spacetime, along the trajectories of the particles themselves.
In the new Hanson experiment, there are actually two pairs of particles,
not just one. Still, retrocausality can resolve the mystery in essentially the
same way, operating on each separate pair. Alice’s influence is linked to
a photon that goes to an intermediate location C, and Bob’s influence is
linked to another photon that also goes to C.6 Given this extra information
at C (available via the two zigzag paths) a selection device at that location
can easily group some of the experiments into cases where the Alice-Bob
correlations look “spooky”.7
As Costa de Beauregard also pointed out, an attractive feature of his
proposal is that because both arms of the zigzag lie in or on the lightcones,
it is immediately congenial to special relativity, in a way in which direct
action-at-a-distance is not. This also distinguishes retrocausality from other
explanations that hope to fill the gap between entangled particles, perhaps
with continuous processes travelling faster than light.
5‘Me´chanique quantique’, Comptes Rendus Acade´mie des Sciences 236, 1632–34 (1953).
6Arguably it is also natural to consider retrocausal influence from the intermediate
measurement at C, but this additional retrocausality is not strictly required in this case.
7This claim follows from the example of delayed-choice entanglement swapping (Ma,
X. et al, ‘Experimental delayed-choice entanglement swapping’, Nature Physics 8, 480–485
(2012). arXiv:1203.4834), which can be treated as an artifact of post-selection rather than
any direct Alice-Bob connection. (We are grateful for comments from A. Laidlaw at this
point.)
5
Many commentators think of the tension between action-at-a-distance
and special relativity as the source of some of deepest puzzles about quan-
tum theory. As David Albert and Rivka Galchen put it, in a piece in Scien-
tific American: “Quantum mechanics has upended many an intuition, but
none deeper than [locality]. And this particular upending carries with it a
threat, as yet unresolved, to special relativity—a foundation stone of our
21st-century physics.”8 But if we keep our eyes on the fact the zigzag retro-
causal proposal avoids this tension completely, it is easy to see that it isn’t
just another form of spooky action-at-a-distance.
Arguments against retrocausality?
We’ve seen that retrocausality is different both from the direct action-at-a-
distance usually held to be implied by the quantum correlations, and from
superdeterminism. And it has advantages over both, in pretty obvious ways
– a better fit with relativity in one case, saving free will in the other. It
sounds like a loophole worth noticing. Is there some good reason to rule it
out of court?
Perhaps it leads to unacceptable paradoxes. Wouldn’t backward causa-
tion lead to time travel-like contradictions? Modern Alice and Bob could
signal to their medieval ancestors, sending them advice on contraception.
But it is easy to show that the kind of subtle retrocausality needed to ex-
plain quantum correlations wouldn’t have such consequences. It couldn’t be
used to signal for much the same reason that entanglement itself can’t be
used to signal.9
Perhaps we should dismiss it because no one has been able to suggest a
way in which it could be experimentally tested. But this, too, is a mistake.
Retrocausality is proposed as an explanation of the correlations observed
in all the standard tests of the relevant quantum correlations, including
those of the Hanson experiment. It is confirmed by those experiments to
same extent that other proposed explanations are also confirmed – including
spooky action-at-a-distance itself. Experiments alone cannot distinguish
between the various proposals. But this is no more a justification for ignoring
retrocausality than it is for ignoring action-at-a-distance – they are in exactly
the same boat, as far as the experiments themselves are concerned, and the
choice between them has to be made on other grounds.
Perhaps we should dismiss it because there is some deeper, philosophi-
cal objection to retrocausality. Ordinarily we think that the past is fixed,
whereas the future is open, or partly so. Doesn’t our freedom to affect the
future depend on this openness? How could we affect what was already
fixed?
8Albert, D. Z. and Galchen, R., ‘A quantum threat to special relativity’, Scientific
American 300, 32–39 (2009)
9Price, H. and Wharton, K., ‘Disentangling the quantum world’, arXiv:1508.01140.
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These are deep philosophical waters, but we don’t have to paddle out
very far to see that Alice has some options. She can say that according to the
retrocausal proposal, quantum theory turns out to show that the division
between what is fixed and open doesn’t line up neatly with the distinction
between past and future. Some of the past turns out to be open, too, in
whatever sense the future is open.
To decide what sense that is, precisely, we’d need to swim out a lot fur-
ther. Is the openness there in the world, or is it a projection of our own
viewpoint as agents, making up our minds how to act? This really is a deep
philosophical issue, but Alice doesn’t need an answer to it. Whatever works
for the future will work for the past, too, in the subtle way it needs to, to
avoid the spooks. Either way, the result will be that our naive view of time
needs to be revised a little bit, in the light of physics – a surprising con-
clusion, perhaps, but hardly a revolutionary one, more than a century after
special relativity wrought its own changes on the surrounding landscape.
(Bob certainly needs a better argument for dismissing retrocausality than
“This isn’t what we’ve always thought!”)
So far, Alice seems to have the better hand, and there are other high
cards we haven’t mentioned. For example, there are new arguments sug-
gesting that time-symmetry might require retrocausality, for reasons novel
to the quantum case.10 But our goal here is not to make a decisive case
for retrocausality. We simply want to point out that in the absence of a
good case against it, the argument for spooky action-at-a-distance cannot
be considered settled.
Back in 1935, it seemed obvious to Einstein and others that there could
be no action-at-a-distance. As Schro¨dinger put it at the time, comment-
ing on the famous EPR paper, “measurements on separated systems cannot
directly influence each other – that would be magic.”11 These days, the
“magic” that Schro¨dinger derided in this way has become accepted ortho-
doxy. Worse still (from the Einstein-Schro¨dinger perspective), it is becoming
orthodoxy that there is simply no alternative, at least unless we are prepared
to embrace superdeterminism and abandon free will. It is too soon to tell
whether the first orthodoxy will survive, but as things stand at the moment,
the second is plainly false. The herd of mainstream opinion has resigned it-
self to the spooks, but there is an open gate leading in a different direction.
10Price, H., ‘Does time-symmetry imply retrocausality? How the quantum world
says “maybe”’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 2012, 43, 75–83.
Pusey, M., ‘Time-symmetric ontologies for quantum theory’, presented at Free Will
and Retrocausality in the Quantum World, Trinity College, Cambridge, 3 July 2014
[http://youtu.be/il19Unc5qVw]. For further discussion see Price, H. & Wharton, K.,
‘Dispelling the Quantum Spooks – a Clue that Einstein Missed?’, arXiv:1307.7744.
11Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 124, 323–38. [Reprinted as Section
I.11 of Part I of Quantum Theory and Measurement (J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek, eds.,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1983).]
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